



신진학자 워크숍

Al-based Intrusion Detection and App Identification for Security

이현우 교수 (한국에너지공과대학교)

AI-based Intrusion Detection and App Identification for Security

Hyunwoo Lee

Korea Institute of Energy Technology (KENTECH) email: hwlee@kentech.ac.kr / lab page: https://ess.kentech.ac.kr





Hyunwoo Lee



Assistant Professor

Career

Assistant Professor at KENTECH (2022.9 - present)

Energy System Security Lab. in Institute for Energy Al

Postdoc Research Associate at Purdue University (2020,8 - 2022,8)

Hosted by Prof. Elisa Bertino and Prof. Ninghui Li

Education

M.S./Ph D. at Seoul National University (2015-2020)

Advised by Prof. Taekyoung Kwon

Dissertation: TLS Extensions for Middleboxes and Edge Computing

B.S. at Seoul National University (2004-2011)

Selected Publications

maTLS: How to Make TLS middlebox-aware? (NDSS '19)

TLS 1.3 in Practice: How TLS 1.3 Contributes to the Internet (www '21)

VWAnalyzer: A Systematic Security Analysis Framework for the Voice over

WiFi Protocol (ASIACCS '22)

An Infection-Identifying and Self-Evolving System for IoT Early Defense from

Multi-Step Attacks (ESORICS '22)

AppSniffer: Towards Robust Mobile App Fingerprinting Against VPN (www '23)

ZTLS: A DNS-based Approach to Zero Round Trip in TLS handshake (www '23)

Towards Efficient Privacy-Preserving Deep Packet Inspection (ESORICS '23)

Sharing cyber threat intelligence: Does it really help? (NDSS '24)



Welcome to Energy System Security Lab. at KENTECH

Energy System Security Lab. (esslab) aims to design and implement secure energy AI systems, and verify security of them!



Security by Design

We design and implement security building blocks for energy systems, including public key infrastructure (PKI) or security protocols (e.g., TLS or IPsec)



Security Verification

We verify security and privacy properties of energy Al systems based on specifications or implementations, leveraging formal or informal methods



Al-driven Security

We study machine-learning-based security building blocks such as intrusion detection systems (IDS) to make energy systems secure and trustworthy



Research Area

- Security by Design: Designing New Security Protocols
- Security Verification: Verifying Properties of Security Protocols
- Al-driven Security: Implementing Al-based Security Systems





We are living in the era of the Internet of Things (IoT)





We are living in the era of the Internet of Things (IoT)

- Power grids / plants
- Mobile devices / networks
- Vehicles
- ...









We are dreaming autonomous systems with Artificial Intelligence (AI)









We are dreaming autonomous systems with Artificial Intelligence (AI)

- Automated (Free from repetitive work)
- Energy/resource-efficient
- Cost-efficient














Diverse Networking Infrastructures

- Cloud/edge computing
- Innovative mobile networks




















Value-added Services


- Smart grids
- Smart cities and smart factories











Network Security is Important!


Larger number of connected devices means larger attack surface



omart gnas

Smart cities and smart factories






2015 Ukraine power grid hack

- Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack by a Russian group "Sandworm"
- Power outages for 230K consumers in Ukraine for 1-6 hours





- Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack by a Russian group "Sandworm"
- Power outages for 230K consumers in Ukraine for 1-6 hours




Survey: 56 percent of utilities have faced a cyberattack in the last

year

Published on October 15, 2019 by Jaclyn Brandt



Operations shutdown



Other Attacks on Infrastructures

- TRITON malware attack in 2017 toward a Saudi petrochemical plant, purposefully designed to cause loss of life
- Attack toward CPC Corp., Taiwan's state-owned energy company, causing the company's payment system into chaos

High Cost to Recover From

The SolarWinds hack will cost an estimated \$100 billion




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
Again, Network Security is Important! How can we Make the Infrastructures Trustworthy and Secure?

High Cost to Recover From

The SolarWinds hack will cost an estimated \$100 billion



End-to-end Communication




End-to-end Communication






Two Ways to Secure the Networking

Encryption Allows only authorized ones to read and write data






- Web Application Firewalls
- Intrusion Detection System



Topic 1: Security by Design

Designing new security
[maTLS (NDSS'19), ZTLS (WWW'23), MT-DPI (ESORICS'23)]






Topic 2: Security Verification


Verifying properties of security protocols

[TLS 1.3 (WWW'21), TELEPORT (AsiaCCS'21), VWAnalyzer (AsiaCCS'22), CTI-Lense (NDSS'24)]





Topic 3: Al-driven Security



Identifying infection vectors from later step attacks



IoTEDef: An Infection-Identifying and Self-Evolving System for IoT Early Defense from Multi-Step Attacks (ESORICS '22)

Lots of attacks include multi-steps: Advanced Persistence Threats (APTs)

The main purpose of APT attacks is to acquire persistence on target systems




It is challenging to identify early-stage attacks



IoT Device




















- 1 Spread malware to other devices
- 2 Ex-filtrate confidential data





Detecting attacks at an early stage and identifying the infection vectors are critical



Early detection is challenging



Early detection is challenging



Zero-day attacks



Early detection is challenging




Zero-day attacks



High false positives




We propose IoTEDef,





We propose loTEDef, an anomaly-based NIDS for IoT devices





We propose loTEDef, an anomaly-based NIDS for IoT devices



Main Goal

To detect multi-step attacks at an early stage with high precision and high recall



Our Approach



Our Approach

1 IoTEDef backward traverses the log of the events upon detecting anomalies related to a later stage event



Our Approach

- 1 IoTEDef backward traverses the log of the events upon detecting anomalies related to a later stage event
- 2 IoTEDef analyzes these events to identify early stage events related to the later stage event




Our Approach

- 1 IoTEDef backward traverses the log of the events upon detecting anomalies related to a later stage event
- 2 IoTEDef analyzes these events to identify early stage events related to the later stage event
- 3 IoTEDef updates the system based on the identified events to improve the performance of detecting such early stage events




IoTEDef Architecture

An Infection-Identifying and Self-Evolving System for IoT Early Defense






Infection Identification



Attention works best due to its support of the long-term dependency



Self-Evolving



Strategy 1: Update with infection-identified events and non-infection events

Strategy 2: Update with infection-identified events

Strategy 3: Update with non-infection identified events



Summary

Motivation

The early detection of the multi-step attack is important but challenging

Design of IoTEDef

An infection-identifying and self-evolving system for IoT early defense from multi-step attacks

Experiment Result

We show that our approach is feasible and effective




Identifying infection vectors from later step attacks

Paper

AppSniffer: Towards Robust Mobile App Fingerprinting Against VPN (www '23)


Mobile App Fingerprinting identifies mobile apps based on traffic analysis

The technique can be used for blocking apps violating a company's policy or performing suspicious activities





Categories of Mobile App Fingerprinting





Categories of Mobile App Fingerprinting




Can these techniques detect malicious apps that use VPN protocols?





Categories of Mobile App Fingerprinting




Can these techniques detect malicious apps that use VPN protocols?





Limitation of FlowPrint

FlowPrint analyzes destination IP addresses of packets to identify mobile apps




*van Ede, Thijs, et al, "FlowPrint: Semi-Supervised Mobile-App Fingerprinting on Encrypted Network Traffic.", *Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS)*, 2020.



Limitation of FlowPrint

With VPN, destination IP addresses are changed; thus, they cannot be used to identify apps




*van Ede, Thijs, et al, "FlowPrint: Semi-Supervised Mobile-App Fingerprinting on Encrypted Network Traffic.", *Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS)*, 2020.



Limitation of AppScanner

AppScanner analyzes a sequence of packet lengths to identify mobile apps




*Vincent F. Taylor et al, "AppScanner: Automatic Fingerprinting of Smartphone Apps from Encrypted Network Traffic", *IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)*, 2016.



Limitation of AppScanner

Due to VPN, packet lengths and underlying protocols are changed; thus, traffic patterns are changed




*Vincent F. Taylor et al, "AppScanner: Automatic Fingerprinting of Smartphone Apps from Encrypted Network Traffic", *IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)*, 2016.



Limitation of ET-BERT

ET-BERT is a traffic representation model with pre-trains deep contextualized datagram-level representation



*Lin, Xinjie, et al. "ET-BERT: A Contextualized Datagram Representation with Pre-training Transformers for Encrypted Traffic Classification." *ACM Web Conference (WWW)*, 2022.



Limitation of ET-BERT

Our analysis shows that ET-BERT highly relies on plaintext features in TCP headers rather than encrypted payloads



TSval: time when the source sent the message

TSecr: time when the destination sent the message


*Lin, Xinjie, et al. "ET-BERT: A Contextualized Datagram Representation with Pre-training Transformers for Encrypted Traffic Classification." *ACM Web Conference (WWW)*, 2022.



AppSniffer

Stage 1: Distinguish VPN traffic from normal traffic

Stage 2: Identify specific apps from VPN and normal traffic







AppSniffer

Stage 1: Distinguish VPN traffic from normal traffic

Stage 2: Identify specific apps from VPN and normal traffic



Key Feature: Number of Flows







AppSniffer

Stage 1: Distinguish VPN traffic from normal traffic

Stage 2: Identify specific apps from VPN and normal traffic

Key Feature:
Packet Length
Sequences &
Directions








Evaluation

AppSniffer achieves the best F1-score (90.63%), comparing with others





Summary

Motivation

The state-of-the-art mobile app fingerprinting techniques are ineffective in identifying apps that use VPN

Design of AppSniffer

A two-stage mobile app fingerprinting framework to identify apps regardless of whether a VPN is used

Experiment Result

We show that our approach is feasible and effective



Thank you!



Hyunwoo Lee (Assistant professor)

E-mail: hwlee@kentech.ac.kr

Homepage: ess.kentech.ac.kr